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Dopamine is implicated in multiple functions, including motor execu-
tion, action learning for hedonically salient outcomes, maintenance,
and switching of behavioral response set. Here, we used a novel
within-subject psychopharmacological and combined functional neu-
roimaging paradigm, investigating the interaction between hedonic
salience, dopamine, and response set shifting, distinct from effects
on action learning or motor execution. We asked whether behavioral
performance in response set shifting depends on the hedonic sali-
ence of reversal cues, by presenting these as null (neutral) or salient
(monetary loss) outcomes. We observed marked effects of reversal
cue salience on set-switching, with more efﬁcient reversals follow-
ing salient loss outcomes. L-Dopa degraded this discrimination,
leading to inappropriate perseveration. Generic activation in thal-
amus, insula, and striatum preceded response set switches, with an
opposite pattern in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC).
However, the behavioral effect of hedonic salience was reﬂected in
differential vmPFC deactivation following salient relative to null re-
versal cues. L-Dopa reversed this pattern in vmPFC, suggesting that
its behavioral effects are due to disruption of the stability and
switching of ﬁring patterns in prefrontal cortex. Our ﬁndings provide
a potential neurobiological explanation for paradoxical phenomena,
including maintenance of behavioral set despite negative outcomes,
seen in impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s disease.
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Introduction
Shifting from one pattern of behavioral response to a more ap-
propriate action in the face of unexpected or surprising events
is central to adaptive behavior. Dopamine is implicated in
shifting response set, including triggering of a behavioral
switch (Cools, Lewis et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2007), learning new
associations (Shohamy et al. 2005), maintenance of learned as-
sociations (Cohen et al. 2002), commission of action (Frank
et al. 2004), and both tracking and responding to rewarding or
punishing (i.e., hedonic or valenced) outcomes in decision
making (Cools et al. 2009; van der Schaaf et al. 2014). Several
brain regions, all of which receive strong dopaminergic innerv-
ation, are thought to support this process, including medial
and lateral prefrontal cortex as well as the striatum (Fellows
and Farah 2003; Izquierdo et al. 2004; Robinson et al. 2010;
Rygula et al. 2010; Hampshire et al. 2012; Fallon et al. 2013).
It has been suggested that aberrant attribution of salience to
cues is central in obsessive–compulsive disorder, addiction
and depression (Diekhof et al. 2008), as well as in the impulse
control disorders observed in Parkinson’s disease (Dagher and
Robbins 2009). However, dopaminergic modulation has mixed
effects on these processes. For example, in learning from nega-
tive feedback in patients with Parkinson’s disease, dopamine
can improve performance in some domains but exerts a detri-
mental effect on others (Cools et al. 2003; Frank et al. 2004;
Shohamy et al. 2005, 2006; Shiner et al. 2012). Here, we
sought to delineate the role of dopamine on the shifting of
response set in healthy individuals, and speciﬁcally how this
depends upon the hedonic salience (e.g., negative valence) of
outcomes.
The neuronal dynamics encoding response set are thought
to involve selection and maintenance within cortico-striatal cir-
cuits (Frank and Claus 2006; McNab and Klingberg 2008).
Within this framework when expectations about outcomes are
violated, as in a reversal, one pattern of neural activity is dese-
lected allowing a new representation to emerge corresponding
to the switch in response set (Deco and Rolls 2005; Friston
1997; Oullier and Kelso 2006; Rabinovich et al. 2008). Our
working assumption is that an unexpected outcome, signifying a
change in—and uncertainty about—contingencies, would cause
a reduction in mesocortical dopaminergic modulation of pre-
frontal activity (Ferron et al. 1984), enabling the emergence of a
new pattern of neuronal dynamics and response set. Further-
more, we predicted that a pharmacological boost to dopamine
would preclude this reduction and compromise set-switching.
One standard view of dopamine—namely the reporting of
reward prediction errors—is based on an assumption that sub-
jects need to learn the value of subsequent actions (Schultz
et al. 1997; Daw and Doya 2006; Niv and Schoenbaum 2008).
Importantly, we employed a task in which stimulus–response–
outcome mappings were deterministic (in contrast to most
reversal paradigms where mappings are probabilistic), such
that unexpected outcomes triggered a switch in response set
rather than new learning, which is also dopamine-dependent.
In this context when subjects have already learned response
contingencies, reinforcement learning about actions has
limited utility. Instead, subjects have to infer changes in contin-
gencies before selecting the appropriate set. In this setting,
dopamine may have a complimentary role in reporting the pre-
cision or conﬁdence in beliefs about the consequences of
action under the current set (Galea et al. 2012).
Unexpected outcomes following an action engender a striat-
al signal, reﬂecting a prediction error thought to emanate
from the nigrostriatal dopamine system. Here, we predicted a
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corresponding reduction in prefrontal responses, due to uncer-
tainty about current set, would be modulated by mesocortical
dopaminergic inputs (Friston et al. 2012). This concurs with
increases in striatal blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
signal seen following salient outcomes such as reward omission
(Pagnoni et al. 2002), or negatively valenced events such as loss
or punishment on the one hand (Cools et al. 2002; Seymour
et al. 2005) and, on the other hand, phasic decrements in BOLD
signal following the unexpected absence of a reward in the
context of a well-established stimulus–outcome train, in dorsal
(Ramnani et al. 2004) and ventral (O’Doherty et al. 2003)
regions of medial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, we asked
whether prefrontal responses to unexpected outcomes would
similarly depend upon the hedonic salience of outcome cues.
Previous ﬁndings from our laboratory have highlighted
functional asymmetries in probabilistic learning requiring
commission or omission of responses, respectively (Guitart-
Masip, Huys et al. 2012), and widespread regions of prefrontal
cortex are differentially activated by action versus action inhib-
ition (Rubia et al. 2001; Criaud and Boulinguez 2013). Note
here we were interested in distinguishing dopaminergic effects
on set-switching separate from its effects on action execution.
To control for differences in movement, we alternated between
“go” and “no-go” response sets which enabled us to average
over behavioral and physiological responses that did, and did
not, involve executive motor components (and nonspeciﬁc be-
havioral inhibition), thereby isolating set-switching per se.
In summary, under placebo, we predicted a reduction in
prefrontal responses following salient reversal cues (correlat-
ing with a putative demodulation of an established pattern of
neural activity), engendering a switch between patterns of
behavioral responses. Under L-dopa, we predicted an impaired
ability to switch behavior following a salient reversal cue, and
a concurrent disruption to the normal pattern of prefrontal re-
sponses. By employing a paradigm which both controlled for
the role of dopamine in learning (by using deterministic out-
comes) and in action execution (by using a Go/No-Go design),
we aimed to isolate and test the unique role of dopamine in re-
sponse set selection under different levels of hedonic salience.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The study and its procedures were approved by a UCL Research Ethics
Committee. All participants gave written informed consent. Only male
participants were included to avoid menstrual cycle-dependent interac-
tions between gonadal steroids and the dopaminergic system (Becker
and Cha 1989; Dreher et al. 2007). Sixteen healthy men [age mean (SE)
23.8 (1.65)] completed the study. Two further subjects completed the
experiment but were not included in the analysis (1 in the dopamine
session and 1 in the placebo session) due to excessive drowsiness (and
excessively low response rates) during the scanning session. No parti-
cipants were taking concurrent medication and none had a history of
neurological or psychiatric illness.
Stimuli and Task
Task Design
We used a novel reversal switching task (Fig. 1). Stimuli consisted of
one of 4 Hiragana (Japanese font) symbols presented in white font on
a black background. One pair of these symbols was presented in any 1
block (in pseudorandomized order). All trials followed the same se-
quence, with each block of trials lasting 17 min.
A block commenced with a single Hiragana symbol presented
on-screen for 200 ms before being masked (by a composite of all 4
Hiragana symbol characters) for a period of time titrated to each sub-
ject’s reaction time (RT) (see below). Subjects were then required to
make an appropriate response, following presentation of one of the 2
symbols, either gripping (Go) or omitting a grip response (No-Go). In
each block, one of the symbols instructed a grip and the other a
no-grip response.
To provide feedback, a colored border then appeared (500 ms)
around the unmasked Hiragana symbol, which indicated the registered
response (Go; or No-Go) made on that trial; a yellow border for a grip
(Go) and a blue border for no grip (No-Go). Following feedback sub-
jects were then presented with an outcome screen (750 ms).
Reversals
At unpredictable intervals, the contingencies for the pair of symbols in
each block were reversed (reversal shifts). Consequently, on reversal
trials, a stimulus for which subjects had previously gripped (Go re-
sponse) now instructed a no-grip response and vice versa. This meant
that subjects performing the expected action would receive an unpre-
dicted or surprising outcome—a signal to switch response set. To
ensure that reversal shifts were unpredictable—and that subjects had
established a speciﬁc response set prior to a reversal—we set a
minimum constraint of 5 correctly executed trials (10 before the ﬁrst re-
versal switch) per contingency before a possible reversal, after which
there was a 50% probability of a reversal per trial. Reversals were
balanced across motor responses (i.e., occurring equally on trials for
expected “grip” and “no grip” responses).
“Null” and “Salient” Blocks
Reversals were cued in 2 different ways across block types. Six blocks
were run in total (3 “null” and 3 “salient” blocks). In “null” blocks, re-
versals were signaled by neutral outcomes (signifying an incorrect re-
sponse to the shifted contingency), while correct responses led to
receipt of one pound (represented on-screen by an empty circle or a
pound coin respectively). In “salient” blocks, reversals were signaled
by loss of a pound (represented by a pound coin picture with a cross
through it)—with no money being lost if responses were correct
(shown as an empty circle on screen). Implicit here is the assumption
that the visual presentation of a monetary loss represents a more hedo-
nically salient event than the visual “null” events where expected mon-
etary reward is absent, although both types of event are “salient” in the
sense of being an unexpected outcome.
Real monetary rewards were provided (see reward schedule below).
Critically, because reversals were rare events and contingencies were
entirely deterministic, participants formed a strong expectation of per-
forming correctly and receiving conﬁrmatory feedback. In addition, by
using fully deterministic outcomes and an appropriate time for re-
sponse execution, we ensured minimal learning was required, thereby
allowing us to focus on reversal shifts—as opposed to reinforcement
learning about action contingencies which come into play within
standard reversal tasks with probabilistic outcomes. Note that in de-
scribing these 2 block types, we focus on the outcomes signaling a re-
versal shift, as this is the behaviorally relevant trigger for a switch in
response set. We measure behavioral performance as accuracy in the
trial following a reversal (i.e., the trial following the unexpected
outcome; Treversal + 1).
In the analysis of the neuroimaging data, we were speciﬁcally inter-
ested in neuronal responses on reversal shifts signaled by salient
outcome cues, relative to neutral outcomes. We isolated these re-
sponses by comparing activation during reversal trials (Treversal), with
an unexpected outcome, with the preceding trial (Treversal− 1) where
outcomes are fully expected. The only difference between these con-
secutive trials is the signal (i.e., outcome cue) indicating a reversal shift
and the subsequent activity we associate with set-switching.
Procedure
Overview
We employed a within-subjects design. All subjects performed the task
on placebo (500 mg soluble calcium, Cacit 1.25, Warner) or L-dopa
(150 mg soluble levodopa, Madopar 187.5 mg, Roche). L-Dopa and
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placebo were dissolved in orange squash and both the participants and
the investigator were blinded to the order of the drug/placebo. After in-
gestion, participants waited for 60 min to ensure maximum peak
plasma drug concentration according to levodopa pharmacokinetics
(Khor and Hsu 2007). The order was randomized and sessions were
scheduled a minimum of 1 week apart—to ensure complete drug
washout in cases where subjects had received drug on the ﬁrst visit.
Different Hiragana symbols were used for each visit (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Task depiction. (A) Schematic of a reversal trial signaled by a salient monetary loss. Subjects have learnt the appropriate response to presentation of one of 2 paired
symbols (Hiragana ﬁgures), either gripping (Go) or omitting a grip response (No-Go). Initially (left—trial before reversal, Treversal− 1) subjects observe a symbol signaling a grip is
required; a yellow border then appears to indicate that the grip has been registered successfully. Subsequently, an outcome screen appears. This example is taken from a block
where subjects avoid a monetary loss when performing correctly; hence, an empty circle is shown to inform that no money was lost. On the next trial (middle—reversal trial,
Treversal), the contingencies have reversed and the elicited response of a grip is now incorrect, and the outcome screen signals loss of money (indicated by a pound sign with a cross
through it). The alternative symbol (not shown) simultaneously switches its contingency from the complimentary “no-grip to avoid loss” to a “grip to avoid loss.” On the next trial
(right—trial after reversal), the subject alters their behavioral response and now does not grip in response to the presentation of this symbol (indicated by the blue border). This is
now the new correct response, and no money is lost (hence, the outcome screen shows an empty circle). (B) Schematic of a reversal trial signaled by a null outcome. In this
example, subjects have learnt that the initial Hiragana symbol (left) signals that a grip is required, and a yellow border then appears to indicate that a grip has been registered
successfully. In this block, the outcome screen indicates that they will receive money for a successful response (indicated by a pound coin). On the next trial (middle), the subject
grips again; however, the contingencies have reversed and the elicited response of a grip is now incorrect. The outcome screen therefore signals a null outcome (indicated by an
empty circle). On the next trial (right), the subject has changed behavior and now does not grip on observing the same symbol (indicated by the blue border) and hence receives
money again for a successful response. In parallel, the alternative Hiragana symbol (not shown) will also switch contingencies on the reversal trial.
Cerebral Cortex 3
 at U
CL Library Services on M
ay 5, 2015
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Participants performed both sessions at the same time of day to control
for any diurnal ﬂuctuations in baseline neurotransmitter levels.
Grip Measurement
To record motor responses, we used a pneumatic handgrip device held
in the right hand (Kurniawan et al. 2010). This MRI-compatible device
was molded from 2 plastic cylinders compressing an air tube con-
nected to a transducer (Honeywell, Morristown, NJ, USA), which con-
verted air pressure into a continuous voltage output. The signal was
recorded (Spike2, Cambridge Electronic Design) and analyzed on-line
in MATLAB 7.1 (www.mathworks.com). Individual maximal grip
strength was measured and used to calibrate the threshold for record-
ing a response (at 10% maximal grip). Visual stimuli were presented
using Cogent 2000 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/ and http://www.icn.
ucl.ac.uk/) and Cogent Graphics (John Romoya, Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL).
Reaction Time Titration
We limited the time per trial that each subject had to emit a grip/no
grip response. This ensured a train of prepotent responses (once con-
tingencies had been learnt), such that only occasional errors were
made (failure to switch response sets following a reversal trial). This
RT limit was individually calibrated according to baseline grip RTs—
allowing us to control for intrinsic within-subject variability in response
speed. The baselinemeasurement, prior to drug/placebo administration,
was setup similarly to the general trial sequence for the switch task. Two
fractals were presented, one cueing a fast grip and one requiring omis-
sion of a grip response. These contingencies were explicitly described
before the task, and feedback was given following each response. The
average +2 SD of RT (of grip trials), averaged over 15 presentations, was
used as the upper threshold time for a response in the reversal switch
task. Average individualized RTs were 620 ms (SE: 35.2).
Subjects were fully informed of the deterministic contingencies, and
that occasionally the mapping of symbols to their motor response
would switch. To familiarize them with this task structure, they were
ﬁrst required in both sessions to undertake a short practice block prior
to scanning. During the practice session, subjects performed the identi-
cal task, except with different Hiragana symbols. Each of 3 scanning
runs, with concurrently collected behavioral data, lasted ∼17 min, and
consisted of 2 randomized blocks, one in which the reversals were sig-
naled by null outcomes and one in which the reversals were signaled
by a “salient”monetary loss.
MRI Scanning
Imaging datawere acquired using a 3T Siemens Allegra scanner equipped
with a Siemens head coil. Anatomical images were acquired using
magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo scans, which were
followed by 1-mm-thick axial slices parallel to the anterior commissure–
posterior commissure plane. Functional scans used a gradient echo
sequence; repetition time, 2.86 s; echo time 25 ms; ﬂip angle 90°; matrix
size 128 × 72; ﬁeld of view 192 mm; slice thickness, 2 mm. A total of
44 axial slices were sampled. The in-plane resolution was 3 × 3 mm.
Payment Schedule
Subjects received payment on completion of both sessions. To ensure
incentive compatibility (i.e., so that subjects knew that each trial had
the potential for real monetary loss or gain), 15 trials of each block
type were randomly selected across sessions and paid out for real.
Data Analysis
Behavior
The critical behavioral trials were the trials after a reversal shift signal
(Treversal + 1). On the reversal trial (Treversal), unexpected feedback
(reversal cues), either in the form of a more salient loss or a less salient
null outcome, signaled the need to change behavior under 2 factors:
Go versus No-Go and drug versus placebo. In other words, there were
4 trial types (Go to avoid loss, No-Go to avoid loss, Go to avoid null,
No-Go to avoid null) executed under 2 drug states (placebo and
L-dopa) in a fully balanced design. Accuracy (proportion correct re-
sponses on the trial following reversal, Treversal + 1) was computed for
each trial type. Comparisons between trial types, at the group level,
were performed using a three-way (reversal type × action × drug)
repeated-measures ANOVA.
Functional MRI
Functional imaging data were analyzed using statistical parametric
mapping (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London,
UK; http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images were realigned with
the ﬁrst volume (after discarding the ﬁrst 6 dummy volumes), un-
warped, normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference
brain, resampled to 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 voxels, and spatially smoothed
(8-mm full-width at half-maximum).
We used a standard summary statistical approach to random-effects
analyses at the between-subject level: at the within-subject level, we
speciﬁed a general linear model (GLM) comprising regressors for each
trial type. For the imaging analysis, we were speciﬁcally interested in the
difference between feedback responses to the trial before reversal—
with an expected outcome—and the reversal trial—with an unexpected
reversal cue. We use this [Treversal− 1− Treversal] difference to index brain
activation preceding a response set shift, separately analyzing brain
activation for salient versus null blocks. Trial-speciﬁc activations
were modeled as box-car functions (with durations set according to
trial length on an individual subject basis). Note this subsumes activ-
ity related to motor preparation, action, as well as responses to the
outcome—by averaging over “go” and “no-go” response sets entailing
behavioral and physiological responses that did, and did not, involve
executive motor components (and nonspeciﬁc behavioral inhibition), we
thereby isolate neural activity underlying response set-switching per se.
The stimulus functions were then convolved with the canonical hemo-
dynamic response function to form functional MRI (fMRI) regressors.
We focus on brain activation preceding behaviorally validated
response set shifts; hence, we stratiﬁed trials into behaviorally correct
and incorrect responses. Our design matrix therefore modeled effects in
the following trial types: (correct) trial before reversal, Treversal− 1; (incor-
rect) reversal trial, Treversal (note that this trial is by default incorrect
because the contingencies have been changed experimentally); correct
trial after reversal, Treversal + 1; incorrect trial after reversal Treversal + 1.We
separately modeled all other correct and incorrect trials. Each block was
modeled separately. The number of error trials (errors on trials exclud-
ing reversal and trial after reversal trials) was relatively small (<5%). Data
from one subject had to be excluded due to a very high overall accuracy
in the trial after reversal (>95%) thereby preventing our ability to con-
trast correct and incorrect responses to reversal trials.
Low-frequency drifts were removed with a high-pass ﬁlter (128-s
cutoff). Short-term temporal autocorrelations were modeled using
a two-parameter autoregression model. Motion correction regressors
(from the realignment procedure) were entered as covariates of no inter-
est. Statistical signiﬁcance was assessed using linear contrasts of the
regression coefﬁcients from the GLM, generating statistical parametric
maps (SPM) of t-values across the brain for each subject and contrasts of
interest. Placebo and dopamine sessions were analyzed separately at the
ﬁrst (within-subject) level, and corresponding contrast images were
taken to the second (between-subject) level for random-effects analysis.
This entailed using contrasts for each subject in placebo and levodopa
sessions in a group level GLM. Paired t-tests were used to produce SPMs
testing for drug effects on responses to reversal cues.
Anatomical localization was implemented by overlaying t-maps on a
normalized structural image (averaged across subjects). All coordinates
are reported in MNI space. Statistical analyses to identify signiﬁcant
voxels were performed in SPM with whole brain family-wise error
(FWE) correction at P = 0.05. Our primary regions of interest focused
on principal dopaminergic targets, speciﬁcally striatum and prefrontal
cortex including ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Haber
2003); hence, we also report signiﬁcant (FWE-corrected) voxels within
these areas. To quantify (in-sample) effect sizes, we extracted response
estimates from 4-mm spheres centered on peak voxels of activa-
tion (using MarsBAR) and show these averaged contrast estimates in
separate bar plots.
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Results
Behavior
To measure efﬁcacy of reversal shifting, we calculated re-
sponse accuracy (i.e., the proportion of correct responses) on
the ﬁrst trial postreversal.
First, we characterized adaptive behavior under placebo and
found subjects were signiﬁcantly better at reversing after a
salient reversal cue compared with a neutral cue (paired t-test,
null vs. salient; T(1,15) =−3.21, P = 0.006; Fig. 2). This sup-
ported our a priori prediction that a salient loss cue is a more
potent catalyst for set-switching than an unexpected absence
of a monetary gain.
We found a reversal type (salient/null) by drug (L-dopa/
placebo) interaction (F1,15 = 11.73, P = 0.004) for performance
accuracy in trials following a reversal. L-Dopa eliminated the per-
formance advantage in trials signaled by a salient cue relative to
a null cue. This resulted in accuracy under levodopa being
equivalent for both conditions (L-dopa: salient vs. null, paired
t-test; t(1,15) = 1.0, P = 0.332; Fig. 2). Performance under null trials
was worse in the placebo compared with the L-dopa group
(t(1,15) =−1.89, P = 0.078, two-tailed), albeit at trend signiﬁcance.
Crucially, there was no main effect of drug (L-dopa/placebo)
(F1,15 = 0.125, P = 0.728) or action (Go/No-Go) (F1,15 = 0.249,
P = 0.625), on reversal accuracy. The absence of a drug effect
on overall accuracy was surprising, and suggests levodopa
administration leads to a selective blunting of set-switching
following hedonically salient outcomes alone. There was no
interaction between either valence (salient/null) and action
(Go/No-Go) (F1,15 = 2.149, P = 0.163), or drug (L-dopa/
placebo) and action (Go/No-Go) (F1,15 = 0.02, P = 0.888).
fMRI
The Effect of L-Dopa on vmPFC Reversal Responses Depends
on Salience
We ﬁrst characterized responses under placebo on reversal trials,
given that the unexpected outcomes on these trials induce subse-
quent behavioral reversal shifts. Thus, we tested the contrast
(Treversal− 1− Treversal) across salient/null blocks in the placebo
group, which indexes differences in neural activation for trials
with expected outcomes Treversal− 1 compared with unexpected
outcomes cueing reversal Treversal. Note that these trials differ
only in terms of the reversal cue, and that, in both trial types, the
sequential behavioral response (Go or No-Go) is identical. Here,
we averaged over block (salient/null) and drug condition (levo-
dopa/placebo). This contrast revealed a relative deactivation in
vmPFC in response to reversal cues (Fig. 3A).
Figure 3. Neurophysiological responses to reversals in vmPFC. (A) Contrast of BOLD activation in the trial before a reversal (Treversal− 1, fully expected outcome) minus the reversal
trial (Treversal, unexpected outcome) averaged over all conditions (placebo/L-dopa and salient/null). Trial-speciﬁc activations were modeled as box-car functions from trial onset, with
durations set according to the trial length—as estimated on an individual subject basis. There was a signiﬁcant reduction in vmPFC activation in response to a violation of
expectations in reversal trials [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space; peak (x, y, z) coordinates: −3, 11, −2; z=3.84, P< 0.005 FWE-corrected] (B) Contrast estimates
plotted for the reversal trial and the trial before reversal in the vmPFC (for trials with subsequent successful reversal shifts). There are differential neural responses in trials with
expected and unexpected outcomes for the distinct trial types (salient loss trials—left; neutral/null trials—right). Avoiding losses under placebo (gray bars) leads to a positive BOLD
response in vmPFC in the fully predicted trials and decreased BOLD response in reversal trials signaled by unexpected losses (*P< 0.05; for further statistical reporting see text).
This pattern is not seen when individuals reverse their behavior following neutral cues. In contrast, under L-dopa (white bars) we observe the exact opposite pattern, with increased
activation for expected outcomes and decreased activation following unexpected outcomes, paradoxically present in null trials and not (as is found under placebo) in the salient
trials. Represented are the mean parameter estimates (β values). Bars show within-subject standard error.
Figure 2. Accuracy trials after reversal shift. Accuracy (percentage correct
responses) in the trial after a reversal shift for both reversal types (salient reversal cue
—gray bars/null reversal cue outcome—white bars), and drug conditions (placebo
and L-dopa). Bars show within-subject standard error. Under placebo, subjects are
more accurate when reversing their behavior after a salient reversal cue compared with
a neutral cue. When subjects were given L-dopa, this performance advantage was
eliminated (*P<0.05; see text for statistical reporting).
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We next tested for the effects of drug (levodopa/placebo)
and reversal type (salient/null blocks) on this response to re-
versal cues, (Treversal − 1− Treversal), extracting contrast estimates
from a 4-mm sphere centered on the peak coordinate in
vmPFC and submitting these to a 2 × 2 ANOVA (reversal type ×
drug). We observed a signiﬁcant interaction between drug and
reversal type (F1,15 = 11.73, P = 0.004), in the absence of either
a main effect of drug (F1,15 = 0.13, P = 0.73) or reversal type sa-
lience (F1,15 = 1,73; P = 0.21).
Delineating these effects with post hoc t-tests demonstrated
the normative pattern on placebo (Fig. 3B). In blocks where re-
versals were signaled by salient monetary losses (i.e., the be-
havioral goal is to appropriately respond to avoid losses), there
was an increase in BOLD signal in vmPFC in trials with fully
expected outcomes (i.e., the trial before reversal) and a
decreased BOLD response in reversal trials (t(1,14) = 2.243,
P = 0.042). This pattern was not present in the blocks where
reversals were signaled by less salient null outcomes. Note this
pattern of physiological responses is consistent with the better
behavioral performance when subjects were cued to reverse
with salient (loss) outcomes.
By contrast, under L-dopa we observed an opposite pattern.
Here, there was also an increased activation on the trial before
reversal with fully expected outcomes and a decreased activa-
tion following reversal cues, but paradoxically this was now
present in “null” blocks and not (as is found under placebo) in
“salient” blocks (t(1,14) = 2.340, P = 0.035; Fig. 3B). This proﬁle
of physiological responses was seen in the context of blunting
of the behavioral performance asymmetry between the salient
and null blocks under L-dopa, and indeed a partial reversal of
this pattern in the behavioral data. These vmPFC responses to
expected versus unexpected outcomes were independent of
action, with no signiﬁcant difference in this contrast for “Go”
versus “No-Go” blocks, either for placebo or L-dopa
[(Treversal− 1− Treversal)Go− (Treversal − 1− Treversal)No-Go: placebo
t(1,14) = 1.09, P = 0.292; L-dopa t(1,14) = 1.43, P = 0.174].
Reversal Responses in Insula and Thalamus are Independent
of Salience and L-Dopa
We next looked for regions with increased activation on rever-
sal trials [i.e., the complementary “prediction error” contrast
(Treversal− Treversal − 1)]. This highlighted relative increases in ac-
tivation in caudate, insula, and thalamus (Fig. 4A) under both
placebo and L-Dopa conditions.
To investigate whether the above-determined regions were
also sensitive to reversal type salience or drug effects, we again
extracted parameter estimates from 4-mm spheres centered on
the peak voxels in these regions and entered the (Treversal−
Treversal − 1) difference into a 2 × 2 (reversal type × drug)
ANOVA. In insula and thalamus, we observed a signiﬁcant pre-
diction error-type (Treversal− Treversal − 1) response in all trial
types (Fig. 4B,C) but no inﬂuence of L-dopa or reversal type
salience in these regions (insula: F1,15 = 0.87, P = 0.376;
thalamus: F1,15 = 0.449, P = 0.514).
Caudate Responses to Reversal Cues Depend on Salience
Conversely, there was a signiﬁcant effect of reversal type sali-
ence on the response to unexpected cues within the caudate
nucleus—a region implicated in goal directed behavior
[(Treversal− Treversal − 1) difference: F1,15 = 7.34, P = 0.01]. There
were signiﬁcant increases in BOLD signal on reversal trials
(with unexpected outcomes) in the placebo condition
(t14 = 2.17, P = 0.048), consistent with a role in signaling pre-
diction error in instrumental tasks (O’Doherty et al. 2004). On
L-dopa, we observed a similar pattern of increased BOLD on re-
versal trials (t(14) = 2.68, P = 0.018), and also a relative decrease
in activation in the trial before reversal (i.e., with fully expected
outcomes), but only in blocks where reversals were signaled
by salient monetary loss (Fig. 4D), and not evident in the blocks
where reversals were signaled by null monetary outcomes.
Hence, while we observed complementary responses in
vmPFC (decreased responses on reversal trials) and caudate
(increased responses on reversal trials), the responses in
vmPFC more closely paralleled the observed differences in
performance, with more accurate responses on placebo with
salient reversal cues, and a similar difference in the proﬁle of
neural activation in vmPFC. Signiﬁcantly, there was a blunting
of reversal trial-speciﬁc vmPFC responses to salient loss rever-
sal cues following levodopa administration (and a paradoxical
enhancement of these responses to null reversal cues).
Discussion
We characterize the inﬂuence of dopamine on set-switching
using a paradigm that differs in 2 key ways from typical rever-
sal tasks. In particular, we balanced for the possible effects of
dopamine on both movement and motor vigor (requiring both
action and action omission), and hedonically salient (negatively
valenced) versus nonspeciﬁc prediction errors (by employing
conditions where reversals were signaled by unpredicted
losses or null events). In addition, a deterministic rather than
probabilistic reversal contingency allowed us to focus on rapid
(inferential) changes in behavioral set rather than gradual
acquisition of learned contingencies (in order to minimize
reinforcement learning about actions). We found that L-dopa
disrupts the normal pattern of response set shifting to salient
reversal cues, while preserving overall behavioral accuracy.
This was paralleled by obliteration of the normal pattern of
prefrontal deactivation in response to salient reversal cues
prior to switches in behavior.
A key ﬁnding under placebo was that subjects were highly
skilled at rapidly altering their behavior following unexpected
outcomes, but were signiﬁcantly less successful at reversal
switching when these reversal cues were less salient. Adaptive
survival mechanisms, conferred by evolutionary selective pres-
sures, are necessarily tuned to avoidance of salient loss and, in
this context, it is unsurprising to ﬁnd such a striking asym-
metry in behavior conditional on the hedonic salience of an
outcome. The pattern of behavior under placebo is in stark
contrast to what we observed following administration of
L-dopa—where an advantage in behavioral switching response
to salient cues was lost. This implies that L-dopa degrades
the discrimination between a salient loss and a neutral null
outcome. This echoes observations that action reprogramming
in response to surprising events is dependent on optimal levels
of dopamine, and that disorders of dopaminergic transmission
can lead to impairments in shifting behavioral set (Berke and
Hyman 2000; Hampshire et al. 2012; Galea et al. 2012). More-
over, on L-dopa we observed a trend toward reversal of the
normal pattern of behavior, with better reversal switching in
response to null outcomes—consistent with evidence that
increasing dopamine selectively stabilizes striatal representa-
tions of a correct behavioral response for rewards in a Go/
No-Go task (Guitart-Masip, Chowdhury et al. 2012) and the
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observation that dopamine has a differential inﬂuence on
rewarding compared with punishing outcomes (van der Schaff
et al. 2014).
Dopamine has a central role in the maintenance of patterns
of neuronal ﬁring in widespread regions of prefrontal cortex
(Durstewitz et al. 1999; Seamans and Yang 2004). For
example, there is a well-characterized dopaminergic inﬂuence
on the representational capacity of working memory mediated
via an effect on delay-period activity in dorsolateral PFC
(Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic 1991; Floresco and Phillips
2001; Fuster 2001). More generally, the prefrontal cortex has
been suggested to maintain patterns of activity corresponding
to behavioral relevant actions and goals (Miller and Cohen
2001). For example, ventrolateral PFC contains neuronal popu-
lations coding for stimuli, actions and behavioral context
(Asaad et al. 2000). Neurons with task-selective delay-period
activity are also present in medial prefrontal cortex (Sakurai
and Sugimoto 1986; Baeg et al. 2003), which may underpin
the maintenance of appropriate reward-based action–outcome
contingencies (Phillips et al. 2004; Deco and Rolls 2005;
Floresco et al. 2005; Winter et al. 2009). The vmPFC is a key
dopaminergic projection target (Haber 2003) and—along with
the DLPFC—is strongly implicated in task switching (Braver
et al. 2003; Crone et al. 2006) and behavioral responding to
error feedback (Greening et al. 2011). Lesions to medial pre-
frontal cortex impair reversal switching in both animals (Dias
et al. 1996; Schoenbaum et al. 2002) and humans (Fellows and
Farah 2003), with structural integrity of the ventromedial
and orbitofrontal PFC being crucial for altering behavior in
response to negative feedback (Tsuchida et al. 2010).
A current behavioral set is thought to be encoded by a
speciﬁc pattern of itinerant dynamics that serves to represent a
sequence of predicted states, a pattern supported or stabilized
by dopamine (Frank et al. 2001; Friston et al. 2012) possibly by
modulating the signal-to-noise ratio in speciﬁc cortico-striatal
circuits (Bamford et al. 2004). In predictive coding accounts of
action selection (active inference), dopamine is thought to
encode the precision (gain) of prediction errors that induce
and maintain a particular response set (Friston et al. 2012; Galea
et al. 2012). This latter mechanism predicts that unexpected
Figure 4. Neurophysiological responses to reversals in caudate, insula, and thalamus. (A) Contrast of BOLD activation in a reversal trial (Treversal, unexpected outcome) minus the
trial before reversal (Treversal − 1, fully expected outcome), averaged over all conditions (placebo/L-dopa and salient/null). Differential activation is seen in bilateral insula, thalamus, and
caudate [peak (x, y, z) MNI coordinates (z scores)—insula: −27, 17, 7 (4.43) and 42, 20, 1 (5.12); thalamus: −6, −19, 7 (4.74) and 6, −22, 7 (4.08); caudate: 12, 5, 7 (4.37);
P<0.005 FWE-corrected]. (B–D) Plots of mean parameter estimates (β values) for the reversal trial and the trial before reversal in the insula (B), thalamus (C), and caudate (D),
contingent upon subsequent successful reversal shifting (i.e., a behaviorally validated response). Here, we observed a prediction error-type response (reduced activation at the time
an unexpected/surprising outcome was presented) across trial types [salient loss trials on left; neutral/null trials on right; placebo (gray bars), L-dopa (white bars)].
(Treversal − 1− Treversal) contrast effects per condition: bilateral insula – (salient loss)placebo: t(1,14) =−5.93, P< 0.001, (null)placebo: t(1,14) =−3.41, P= 0.004; (salient loss)L-dopa:
t(1,14) =−2.86, P=0.012; (null)L-dopa: t(1,14) =−5.03, P<0.001. Bilateral thalamus—(salient loss)placebo: t(1,14) =−4.65, P< 0.001, (null)placebo: t(1,14) =−3.14, P= 0.007;
(salient loss)L-dopa: t(1,14) =−1.9, P=0.07; (null)L-dopa: t(1,14) =−3.11, P=0.008. Left caudate—(null)placebo: t(1,14) =−1.807, P=0.092; (salient loss)L-dopa: t(1,14) =−2.803,
P=0.014. Within-subject standard error bars are shown. *P<0.05; +P< 0.1.
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outcomes should lead to a reduction in dopaminergic modula-
tion of prefrontal cortex, allowing escape from one pattern of
neuronal attractor dynamics to an alternative pattern, facilitat-
ing a reversal switch (O’Reilly et al. 2002; Deco and Rolls
2005). Compatible with these ideas, we observed in some con-
ditions a decrease in vmPFC BOLD response in reversal trials.
This decrease in vmPFC activity at the point of reversal is also
consistent with previous observations in operant tasks requir-
ing tracking of a stimulus–response–outcome set (O’Doherty
et al. 2003), and perhaps reﬂect the loss of cue-selectivity
within prefrontal neurons, as noted in electrophysiological re-
cordings of reversal tasks (Schoenbaum et al. 2007). Although
dorsolateral PFC has a well-established role in maintenance of
representations—often in the context of working memory
paradigms—interestingly, we did not observe activation in this
region. This may well reﬂect the fact that DLPFC supports
more abstract (perceptual) maintenance functions while
ventromedial PFC may support maintenance of speciﬁc stimu-
lus–outcome contingencies (Ostlund and Balleine 2007; Hamp-
shire et al. 2012). Our paradigm focused upon reward-based (i.
e., hedonic) stimulus–outcome associations rather than main-
tenance of perceptual representations, and we note that there
is good evidence in the literature to highlight a role for medial
PFC regions in supporting a sustained representation of “ex-
pected value,” including in sequential tasks with delayed or de-
ferred outcomes (e.g., Symmonds et al. 2010). In other words,
a vmPFC may subserve a role here akin to that of DLPFC, but
in the domain of maintenance for stimulus–action–outcome as-
sociations that are hedonically relevant.
Signiﬁcantly, the modulation of vmPFC activity in response
to unexpected outcomes in the placebo condition was evident
only for salient (negatively valenced) outcomes, paralleling
our behavioral ﬁndings of better performance in this condi-
tion. Moreover, boosting brain dopamine levels by pretreating
with L-dopa blunted this vmPFC response to negatively
valenced trials, and paradoxically enhanced a response to null
events. In other words, the behavioral decrement (in terms
of the reduced effect of salience on performance) can poten-
tially be explained by the fact that a relative prefrontal deactiva-
tion that occurs in the salient reversal condition on placebo
is also seen to occur in the null reversal condition on L-dopa.
This strongly indicates that vmPFC is attuned to maintenance
of behavioral set contingent on hedonically salient outcomes
(i.e., rewarding or punishing) over and above sensitivity to
generally surprising outcomes. Dopaminergic disruption
selectively obliterates this intrinsic sensitivity to valenced out-
comes, although overall behavioral performance is maintained,
and this is suggestive that modulation by L-dopa may lead to
aberrant attachment of salience to nonsalient outcomes. This is
also consistent with ﬁndings that vmPFC is involved in the
representation of value and reward (O’Doherty et al. 2001;
Gottfried et al. 2003) and unites ideas that vmPFC is involved
in tracking value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006) with an
hypothesis it is also involved in maintenance and direction
of behavioral set (Fellows and Farah 2003; Rushworth et al.
2007).
The PFC has a key role in the control of action (Fuster 2001),
while dopamine acts to inﬂuence motor responses (Salamone
et al. 2003; Guitart-Masip, Chowdhury et al. 2012a). In light of
this, it was essential to control for motor execution when
identifying a role for dopamine in set shifting. Importantly, the
effects seen in vmPFC were invariant to the execution or
omission of a motor response. This supports the notion that
these neuronal pools encode a behavioral set per se, independ-
ent of the commission (execution) of an action, with dopamine
enabling maintenance of a representation of speciﬁc state-
sequences rather than simply facilitating movement.
In healthy individuals, intrinsic dopamine levels are likely
to be optimized. Given that the innate salience of negative
outcomes is also likely to reﬂect a well-tuned behavioral adap-
tation, it is perhaps unsurprising that our dopamine manipula-
tion obliterated this normal sensitivity to loss. It is tempting to
speculate that enhancement of dopamine in this experiment
has led to degraded task performance on the basis of the well-
established suggestion of an inverted U-shaped relationship
between dopamine and performance (Cools and D’Esposito
2011; Stuss and Knight 2013). However, we acknowledge here
a considerable interindividual variability and as we cannot
assay individual dopaminergic function we cannot draw are
any conclusions in this regard.
Dynamical (attractor-based) models of response set rever-
sals entail suppression of responses at one level of a neural
hierarchy coupled to enhanced responses at complementary
levels because of reciprocal information passing (Friston
1997). In these models, a lower level represents or predicts the
sequence of actions and outcomes under the current set, and a
higher (e.g., prefrontal) level represents the current set itself.
Although one could envisage that different levels of such an
inferential neuronal hierarchy are instantiated by specialized
neuronal pools within prefrontal cortex (Deco and Rolls 2005),
the function and architecture of topographically distinct
cortico-basal ganglia loops and pathways (Chevalier and Deniau
1990; Haber 2003), and a wealth of behavioral evidence (e.g.,
Frank and Claus 2006; Cools, Lewis et al. 2006; Wunderlich
et al. 2012; Guitart-Masip, Huys et al. 2012) strongly implicates
cortico-striatal interactions in directing goal-orientated behavior.
Given this integration, we anticipated a reciprocity of response
patterns (i.e., relative activations at one level of a hierarchy
coupled to relative deactivations at an adjacent level). We ob-
served a degree of reciprocity in response to reversal cues, with
decreases in vmPFC responses concurrent with increases in
caudate responses. This echoes a neurochemical reciprocity
between the PFC and striatum, whereby increases in PFC dopa-
mine are associated with decreases in the basal ganglia and vice
versa (Pycock et al. 1980; van Schouwenburg et al. 2010). This
may partly reﬂect caudate involvement in signaling prediction
error during instrumental learning tasks (O’Doherty 2004;
Clarke et al. 2011). It also accords with theories suggesting
a “gating” role for the basal ganglia (Frank and Claus 2006;
McNab and Klingberg 2008). The strongest established
prefrontal-striatal anatomical connections are between caudate
and lateral prefrontal areas. However, the vmPFC also projects
to the medial wall of the caudate nucleus, adjacent to the ven-
tricle (Haber and Knutson 2009). Moreover, striatal projection
ﬁelds from medial prefrontal cortex extend throughout central
and dorsal caudate and putamen nuclei, and there is substantial
cross-talk between cortico-striatal circuits at the level of the
striatum (Kasanetz et al. 2008). It is therefore possible that the
caudate region we observed directly reﬂects this anatomical reci-
procity between cortex and striatal hierarchical levels. It is also
probable that the caudate plays a role in supporting behavioral
performance in this set-shifting task. We note that the caudate is
implicated in goal directed value representation (Wunderlich
et al. 2012). We suggest that the difference in caudate activation
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under L-dopa is likely to contribute to the observed differences
in behavioral accuracy. However, it is also important to note that
prefrontal responses to reversals in the normative (placebo)
condition were most marked following salient loss outcomes in
a way not seen within striatal regions.
It is interesting to note that we also observed “prediction
error”-type responses in thalamus and insula, with increased
activation following unexpected cues during reversals. The
insula, which enjoys reciprocal connections to striatum, thal-
amus and frontal cortex (Flynn 1999), has been associated
with interoception, salience, monitoring uncertainty, and
tracking emotionally relevant events (Craig 2003; Critchley
et al. 2004; Preuschoff et al. 2008; Cauda et al. 2012). The
medial thalamus also projects to the vmPFC (Derrfuss et al.
2004) and striatum (Vertes et al. 2012). In a hierarchical model
structure, one speculation is that these regions may represent
predictions about interoceptive states (Gu et al. 2013) and
lower level sensations (Adams et al. 2013), respectively. The in-
ﬂuence of several regions expressing prediction error-type re-
sponses could drive response set-switching for hedonically
“null” outcomes, and explain why overall accuracy is main-
tained on L-dopa despite the alterations seen in prefrontal cor-
tical activation.
More broadly, it has been suggested that PFC and basal
ganglia dopamine regulate a balance between 2 functionally
opponent processes, with PFC dopamine regulating behavioral
stability and the basal ganglia dopamine promoting ﬂexibility
(van Schouwenburg et al. 2010). Our data enrich these theories
by suggesting that (metastable) representations of behavioral
sets are maintained in sectors of PFC under a dopaminergic in-
ﬂuence, and that the breakdown and re-establishment of cortical
dynamics—corresponding to a reversal switch—relies on transi-
ent suppression of this inﬂuence, following an unexpected
outcome. In turn, this suppression is disrupted by exogenous
L-dopa administration, with evidence that vmPFC in particular is
driving the observed behavioral differences. This resonates with
a previous demonstration of dopamine-induced changes in
striatal functional connectivity, whereby L-dopa simultaneously
increases functional connectivity between striatum and motor
outﬂow regions in brainstem and cerebellum, while reducing
(functional) connectivity between striatum and medial prefront-
al cortex (Kelly et al. 2009).
In conclusion, we show an effect of salience on set-
switching, with more efﬁcient reversal following unexpected
losses compared with null outcomes was abolished by L-dopa,
both at the level of behavior and associated prefrontal re-
sponses. Context sensitive processing requires an intact inter-
play between various cortical and subcortical regions that form
the brains reward circuits which is impacted by alteration of
endogenous dopamine levels in the brain (Diekhof et al.
2008). This alteration in a balance between the impact of
hedonically salient, compared with neutral, outcomes might
underlie a range of phenomena, including the bias in salience
attribution to cues observed in the depressive state, addiction
(Diekhof et al. 2008) and Tourette syndrome (Gilbert et al.
2006) all of which implicate dysfunction in dopaminergic path-
ways. It might also explain common clinical syndromes such
as pathological gambling, where there is a lack of avoidance
of negatively reinforced actions and impulse control disorders
in Parkinson’s disease (Evans et al. 2004), where a blunting or
reversal of the normal suppression of activity might explain
a paradoxical maintenance of behavioral set in the face of
negative outcomes.
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